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Abstract
Our title is taken from a poem, 'Chained', by the Aboriginal author and activist Kevin Gilbert (1990: 38). The
poem gives expression to a contradiction of 'white man law' in Australia:
Pinchim wimmen, pinchim land
Kill the Blackmen, whiteman grand
Him make law for whiteman good
Him steal land and Blackman food
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'He "Look" Honest· Big White Thief
Valerie Kerruish andJeannine Purdy

Introduction

Our title is taken from a poem, 'Chained', by the Aboriginal author and
activist Kevin Gilbert (1990: 38). The poem gives expression to a
contradiction of 'white man law' in Australia:
Pinchim wimmen, pinchim land
Kill the Blackmen, whiteman grand
Him make law for whiteman good
Him steal land and Blackman food

Gilbert's work often focused on the differences between white appearances
and Aboriginal realities. He was far too astute, however, to regard such
dichotomies as either simple, or simply overcome. This dimension is
brought out in his poem, 'True'(1990: 112):
Yet you believe and you can't be wrong
For each man's truth is another's wrong

The relevance of Gilbert's poetry here lies not only in its power to evoke
perspectives of which non-Aboriginal peoples are often unaware, but as an
introduction to this paper and its analysis of the Australian case of Maho v
The State ofQueensland (No.2) (1992) (hereafter 'Maho (No2)').l
Much has been written on Maho (No 2), but in our view, if the pen is to be
mightier than the holy dollar, there is more yet to be said. It is well enough
recognised that 'native title', as this form of entitlement is now called, is a
belated and minimal acknowledgment of indigenous ownership of the
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Australian continent and contiguous islands prior to British colonisation.
More recently the limited character of the abrogation of terra nullius - the
setting aside of the doctrine for the purposes of land ownership but not of
either sovereignty or jurisdiction - has been noticed (Ritter 1996). In so far
as terra nullius (or more precisely its companion doctrine in common law)
was set aside, as well as with respect to such economic and cultural
benefits as may flow to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples from
it, the Mabo (No.2) decision, in our view, is welcome.
It is also our view that, in the non-recognition of aboriginal sovereignty and
jurisdiction, the context of social relations between aboriginal and nonaboriginal Australians continues to be colonial. Anglo-Australian law does
not escape this context. On the contrary, in its application to indigenous
peoples, even as an intended retreat from earlier phases of colonisation, it
repeats the denial of self-determination for aboriginal peoples.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander responses to this decision and its
aftermath are diverse and it is not to our point to write on their behalf. We
write on our own behalf. The observation that humans make their history
in circumstances that are not of their choice (after Marx 1973a: 146) applies
to us as well as to others more obviously constrained by circumstances not
of their choosing. The process of making, and being constrained by, history
generalises across dynamics of interaction between peoples. Cultural
identities and locations within the political economy of nation states are
formed within that process, 'ours' as well as 'theirs'.
International deployment of capital, restructuring of markets and
movement of people only underlines the continuing relevance and
specificity of struggles of indigenous peoples. They have survived the
European belief that they are 'peoples without history' and its various
determinations in the Australian context: the doctrine of terra nullius, the
policies of 'smoothing the dying pillow' and assimilation, the administrative
practice of classifying Aboriginal people with flora and fauna, and the
'White Australia' immigration policy. We write about the Anglo-Australian
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law's part in this process from the perspective that our own cultural and
personal identity is implicated in the dynamic referred to.

Legal Thought
The concept of nation and national identity is virtually unquestioned in
legal thought. The idea of a national law ('Australian common law')
presupposes it as that which the law belongs to and serves, binds together,
heals of its history, secures in its future. At the level of policy, 'White
Australia' has become 'multicultural Australia'. Aboriginal Australia is,
according to present national policy of reconciliation, no longer to be
exterminated, integrated or assimilated. A new accommodation, a new
Australian national identity, it is said, is being forged with Mabo (No.2) as
its impetus.
We do not disagree. But because the concept of nation is presupposed by
legal thought, and therefore presupposed by Mabo (No.2), we regard this
impetus as dubious. It is important to remember that from a perspective to
which Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people may adhere we are
colonisers. This perspective calls into question the history of the formation
of the Australian nation. To begin with then, this question must be
reinserted into thought about Anglo-Australian law and Mabo (No.2) in
particular.
Inevitably, following any such insertion, tensions with the legal method of
dealing with the judgments of courts, such as Mabo (No.2), and
conventional legal thought result. Two points have particular relevance to
our analysis. First, 'law' is distinguished from 'fact' in both legal and nonlegal thought. In the institutional context of legal practice, however,
methods of fact finding or proof are tied in to practices and procedures of
litigation and regulated by the law of evidence. Furthermore which facts are
relevant is determined by rules or propositions of law. Practically then law
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takes control of fact, or to put that another way, in legal thought, law takes
priority over fact. 2 The law/fact relation will still be an interactive one, but
the relation is lop-sided, weighted on the side of law. This practical and
institutional shaping of ideas gets a particular cultural gloss in the idea of
'rational' practices and procedures of fact finding in modern Western law
that contrast with 'irrational' methods of ordeal, swearing, or divination
characteristic of primitive forms of law. If this weight of law over fact sheds
some light on how a populated country can be terra nullius for legal
purposes, the rationality involved has its own peculiarities. It is not,
evidently and despite its claim, the reason of being factually correct. But
nor is it, quite, the reason of an imperialist or nation state. It is important,
in re-inserting the formation of the Australian nation into legal thought, not
to miss the specificity of the reason of law in too quick a reduction.
The second point focuses on that reason via the practices of legal argument
and reasoning. The law/fact distinction is observed in these practices with
the result that they are conducted in terms of the idea that le~al judgment
is a matter of applying general rules to particular cases. Most legal
theorists, particularly within common law systems, recognise that this is
not a strictly deductive exercise. Interpretation of the rules is always
involved and rules are interpreted and reinterpreted to accommodate
changing social, economic and political conditions. Furthermore, while
there is political controversy about what judges ought to do, they have the
power to take interpretation to the point of invention and create new rules
or doctrines. When this power is exercised it will be very carefully justified
in terms of more abstract principles or ideals to which, it is said, the law is
committed.
4

Mabo (No.2) was a case of this latter kind and one of the principles seen

as vindicated by it is that of equality or non-discrimination. The law, it is
said, treats individuals who come before it in the same way - equally and
impartially: 'without fear, favour or affection'. It treats like cases alike and
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different cases differently. But it has its own criteria of like and unlike cases,
criteria that are written in known or at least knowable rules or doctrines.
It is a truism that the idea of equality before the law is legitimative, that is, it
provides apparent legitimacy to outcomes which can in effect embed
inequality. But the well rehearsed critiques of legal equality are not to our
point. Just as a legitimative idea or principle of modern Western law, legal
equality is an important component of that law's peculiar rationality. In
particular it is vital to grasping the concept of the legal person and the
place of that concept in legal thought. The sense in which, in legal thought,
all parties are treated alike is that they are treated as 'persons', as free and
equal subjects of the law's address. They are 'free' in the double sense. First
they are free (in the sense of stripped) of all their actual characteristics
(from names to locations within basic social relations). Second they are
supposed to have capacity for choice or free will. Equality at law inheres in
this dual freedom; that is, all those who come to the law are equally
stripped of their actual characteristics and equally presumed to be
responsible for their own actions.
Who, or for that matter what, is to be treated as a person, or as having
'legal personality' is a question that is differently answered in different
times and places. The idea is a curious one. On the one hand to deny
human beings legal personality is, in the limit case, slavery. On the other as
persons, as 'free and equal subjects of the law's address', actual human
beings (or corporations or institutions) become objects, the bearers of
rights, powers and duties which are determined by law. The subjectivity of
the legal subject, as it turns out, is confined to being responsible for
whatever those determinations are. Thus by being given status as legal
person, the parties to litigation are re-clothed with a more determined legal
identity or persona. They become mortgagors and mortgagees, landlords
and tenants, husbands and wives. They are placed back into relations which
are now legal relations. Sometimes legal personae are conditioned by social
relations of sex and race: 'husband' and 'wife' for example, or victims of
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sexual and racial discrimination. Usually they are linked to some action or
transaction which has been done or entered into. How willingly, with what
understanding and in what circumstances - all questions which count in
saying what the action or transaction actually meant in its social context are taken up into a context of doctrinal determination. In the result the
legal personae can have a great deal or very little to do with who the parties
think they are, what they thought they were doing and what they wanted to
accomplish.
Looked at in this way, legal reasoning is a process of determining the
identities of the parties to a case to which the concept of the legal person is
basic. It is a process that begins with the parties to a case being
characterised as persons - dis-located (or atomistic), free of all social,
historical and cultural determination, and thus equally tabula rasa on
which the law can write. This approach is the one we take to our analysis of
Mabo (No.2). Analogously with Marx's judgment that the commodity is the
elementary form of the wealth of societies and that a critique of the
production process of capital must (as a matter of dialectical method)
begin with analysis of the commodity (Marx 1938, 1973a),5 we take the
6
person to be the elementary concept of modern Western law. This enables
the specificity of legal reason to be maintained against too quick a
reduction of the legal to the political. It refers back to our previous
comment with respect to not too simplistically reducing legal reasoning to
the reasoning of an imperialist or nation state. To do so is to underestimate
the legitimative power of legal reasoning, a power against which perhaps
many colonised peoples are immune, but which was recognised by Gilbert:
'Yet you believe and you can't be wrong'. Legal reasoning may further the
interests of imperialism, but we need to deconstruct its legitimacy for
believers if we are to challenge its power. With the specificity of the legal
anchored to the person, the confusion engendered by the fact that this
very specificity is a social and political phenomenon is more easily tackled.

151

152

Kerruish &Purdy

The concept of nation as presupposed in legal thought is a foundation of
that thought. In legal thought the Australian nation's existence is
unquestionable and this unquestionability finds expression in terms of
sovereignty. Onto this an idea of a sovereign-subject relation as a vertical
power relation has been overlaid. Within legal thought this relation is seen,
in the first place as a political relation - one that is not of the law's making
because it is about the making of modern Western law, as legislation and as
the conferring on the courts of the authority to decide cases (jurisdiction).
Second, although the sovereign-subject relation is not of the law's making,
it can, in limited cases, fall within the law's jurisdiction. In these cases, the
law can address both sovereign and subject, but as in other matters, can
address them only as persons. The sovereign as a legal person is 'the
Crown'. The subject will have whatever persona is pinned on him or her.

Mabo (No.2)

We have already referred to various manifestations of the doctrine of terra
nullius and to the point that, as a legal doctrine, it relates to sovereignty,
jurisdiction and property. In the area of property law, prior to Mabo (No.2),
terra nullius meant that Aboriginal people, relating to land in accordance
with their customs and law, did not have the identity of property owners.
Aboriginal people were never classified, at law, as slaves. Nonetheless in an
early court decision dealing with 'fundamental principles' of ownership of
land in New South Wales which was argued out between the Crown or
British sovereign and colonists, aboriginal ownership did not cross the
threshold of the court's perceptions. So far as the common law of property
was concerned they were neither slaves nor persons. They were inhabitants
of terra nullius. 7
In its partial rejection of the terra nullius doctrine the Mabo (No.2)
decision made a legal identity - 'native title claimant/holder' - available to
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Aboriginal peoples within Anglo-Australian property law. This identity, like
that of the individual owner of private property in land, is constituted in
legal thought within a broader political relation of sovereign and subject
that is outside or foundational to legal thought: the sovereignty side, so to
speak. of terra nullius.
According to the majority judges in Mabo (No.2), the common law
recognises a set of rights coming from aboriginal law. Anglo-Australian law
does not however recognise aboriginal law as law but as fact - to be proved
as to its existence and content by evidence. This looks, on its face, like the
recognition of foreign law in cases in which one or both parties have such
significant contacts with another country as to make that country's law
relevant (private international law) . There too foreign law is admitted as
fact not law. 'Law' is that which makes this concession and admits the
evidence. It is assumed that there is one supreme law within a territory or
nation. It is the law of a sovereign or sovereign power who or which
confers authority to decide cases Ourisdiction) on the courts. But there is a
salient difference between private international law and the law of native
title. In private international law, foreign law is - indeed must be - the law of
an internationally recognised sovereign. Aboriginal sovereignty, however, is
not acknowledged by the Australian state and cannot therefore be
recognised by the courts of that state as foreign law.
In this particular interplay of national (and international) sovereignty,
jurisdiction and property law, the doctrine that is being maintained is one
of English common law according to which the various Australian colonies
are classified as 'settled', rather than conquered or ceded. The
consequence is the reception of the common law of England as the law and
the only law of the land. At some point in time this becomes Australian
common law. When and precisely how is a juridical puzzle that is less arid
than it seems, though we cannot pursue that here. Our point is that the
coloniser remains, according to first English and then British and now
Australian common law, a settler of terra nullius and the law that confers
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and protects his or her property rights rules on the same basis, that is, that
the coloniser is a settler.
According to English philosophers and jurists who witnessed the
transformation of a feudal to a modern common law, the relation between
sovereign and subject has for one of its chief ends, the recognition (for
Locke, 1960: 395fO or constitution (for Hobbes 1651: 202, 294ff, and
Bentham 1802: 41£0 of rights of private property. Changes in the character
of property effected by capitalist production have been expressed in
modification of these classical theories (Schumpeter 1942: 139ff;
Vandervelde 1980). In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
property has increasingly assumed the commodity form and commercial
imperatives linked to marketing for mass consumption, have brought into
the law a limited but significant concern for issues of distribution. While
this concern, already apparent in the writing of ).S. Mill (1848: 231£0 has
found expression in principles of fairness (Rawls 1972: 11£0 it remains the
case that government is constrained, both politically and legally, where it
acts against private property rights in land to which it, in the shape of the
Crown, has given title. Moreover, because the Crown was seen to be the
source of all title to land in Australia, the constraints on government were
severe.
Mabo (No.2) was indeed a hard case. It not only raised issues of how to

'balance' classical liberalism, in which private property rights are seen to
guarantee individual autonomy against the state, with a redistributive
principle of fairness, which is somewhat more alive to discrimination on
'grounds of race and sex (if not class). The further difficulty was that the
overriding context remained one in which private property rights in land
can only exist at all in Australia on the basis of the non-existence of native
title. We should expect then to find quite some pragmatism in Mabo
(No.2).

The sovereignty of the British/Australian crown was not challenged in
Mabo (No.2). But that sovereignty entered the case in the two ways
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sketched above. First, it is affirmed as the unquestionable source of the
court's authority to decide the case, that is, it confers jurisdiction. Second
the sovereignty of the British/Australian crown is affirmed as the source of
all non-native titles to land and therefore, in order to legitimise these titles,
as having the power to extinguish native titles. The exercise of this power,
extinguishment of native title, is an act. But what acts suffice and by what or
whose agency is this sovereign power exercised? Brennan]. writes that
the exercise of a power to extinguish native title must reveal a clear and
plain intention to do so, whether the action is taken by the Legislature or
by the Executive (Mabo (No 2): 64).

Again, he writes of the Crown's grant of land revealing 'a clear and plain
intention to extinguish native title' (Mabo (No 2): 68). To legal readers it is
clear that Brennan]. is not referring here to any actual intention, any
determined state of the will of an actual individual at all, but to a fictional
intention which is constructed by the court from 'the effect which the grant
has on the right to enjoy native title' (Mabo (No 2): 68). Later indeed when
Brennan]. summarises his understanding of the common law, he no longer
write$ of intention at all, but of inconsistency (Mabo (No 2): 69).
Such a redefining from intentionality to inconsistency is essential. There is
an actual individual whose subjective intentions could be being talked
about, namely the monarch - King George or Queen Victoria etc. But while
aboriginal peoples might take this quite seriously, the law does not.
Principles of the rule of law, articulated by the Australian High Court in
terms of responsible government and representative democracy, entail that
the intention in question is the fictional intention of an institution - the
Legislature or Executive standing for 'the Crown in the right of the
Commonwealth or State' depending on which entity has constitutional
power over the land in question.
This has an awkward consequence. If the starting point is that historically and albeit wrongly -Australia was considered to be a terra nullius, there can
not have been any recognition of native title. It would follow that there
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could not have been any intention to extinguish it. But if native title could
not have been extinguished because there had been no intention to do so,
native title claims could potentially affect all sorts of Anglo-Australian land
holdings. Predictably enough, the High Court avoided this conclusion, and
avoided it precisely by use of the device of a putative intention ascertained
through inconsistency.
C

Why does the Court sail so close to this dangerous wind? Why does it talk
in terms of intention at all? The question is in no way fanciful. In a later
case, in which the High Court had to consider the validity of legislation
passed by the state of Western Australia to extinguish native title (State of
Western Australia v The Commonwealth 1995), elaboration of the law
concerning the effects of British sovereignty over Western Australia is
almost purely in terms of the 'manifest intention' of the Crown to
extinguish native title in Western Australia. The majority judgment
concedes that the inquiry is 'somewhat artificial'. The courts at the time of
colonisation treated the country as if it were 'desert and uninhabited', and
the 'true inference to be drawn - if not the certain fact' was that Aboriginal
title to land had been ignored (1995: at 432). There is a genuine puzzle
here. Why insist on a standard of extinguishment which involves positing a
clear and plain intention to extinguish something that was known not to
exist? Why this leap into counterfactuality if not sheer incoherence?
The short answer is that the Court is struggling to maintain three basic legal
principles - the principles of individual responsibility and equality before
the law that inhere in the concept of the legal person, and the property
principle. The actual root of all property in land for non-aboriginal
Australians was acts of dispossession of aboriginal people - acts of theft, if
that prior possession constituted property - for whom no person has ever
been held responsible. This was the problem faced by the High Court in
Mabo (No.2). From the standpoint of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people, the characterisation of these acts as theft was never in doubt. As
they kept on drawing attention both nationally and internationally to this
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point,8 and given legislative enactment in Australia of race discrimination
legislation, what was once convenient, the legal denial of the existence of
recognisable Aboriginal property in land,9 became an embarrassment. This
'solution' could not be re-cycled without casting doubt on the veracity of
the Australian common law's commitment to equality and on the Australian
state's commitment to international treaties to which it is signatory.
Moreover, high profile examples of Aboriginal activism, which attracted the
support of elements of the trade unions and broader community, such as
Noonkanbah (see Hawke and Gallagher 1989), and recurrent debate about
land rights legislation since the 1970's, were creating a climate of
uncertainty, particularly for mining and other 'resource development'
projects. In this context the clarification of indigenous peoples' rights in
Australia was never going to be solely for their benefit.
Interestingly, Brennan J. also used Mabo (No.2) to benefit the common
law. His judgment is insistent upon absolving the common law from any
blame for the dispossession of Aboriginal peoples. It is a revealing
curiosity. 10 Brennan states that even if no Aboriginal people were to 'enjoy
their native title' as a result of the Mabo (No.2) decision,
it is appropriate to identify the events which resulted in the dispossession
of the indigenous inhabitants of Australia, in order to dispel the
misconception that it is the common law rather than the action of
governments which made many of the indigenous people of this country
trespassers on their own land (at 69).
It would seem that admitting the law's complicity in acts of theft is
analogous to holding the Christian God responsible for human sin or

suffering. In both cases it is the ascription of free will or choice to
individual humans that avoids the unwanted conclusion. For Australian
jurisprudence, the ambiguous figure of the Sovereign is an additional
blessing. For he, she or it can be blamed, can apologise, can take the moral
and political weight of the wrong done so that there is no reason to doubt
the integrity of the common law in its adherence to its own principles of
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individual responsibility and equality before the law. Suddenly here, the
common law is not as in positivist legal thought ll the command or posited
rules of the sovereign. An older idea of the common law, as the law of the
12
(English) land and the principle of the ancient constitution comes into
play.
Unfortunately, however, as the furious reaction to Mabo (No.2/ 3 of the
New Right and the old (and declining: Markus 1994: 217-9) AngloAustralian elites attest, this leaves out of account the law's role in the
constitution and protection of the private property rights of all nonaboriginal Australians. The law can blame as it will. It can proclaim its
concern for justice and regret its subjugation to a mightier sovereign power
as it might. It cannot escape the strength of its own private property
principle. Here Brennan's judgment suggests a covert hope: that apart
from this particular case, it will turn out that the 'tides of history' that swept
British sovereignty over the Australian continent, extinguished native title.
BrennanJ.'s voice is dolorous:
...when the tide of history has washed away any real acknowledgment of
traditional law and any real observance of traditional customs the
foundation of native title has disappeared (at 69).

And if hope and history seem too fragile avehicle to assure the inviolability
of private property rights in land stemming from Crown grant, there is
comfort to be had, consistently with common law theory, in a timehonoured doctrine which could be used in future cases to justify a decision
in favour of those to whose benefit the sovereign dispossessed Aboriginal
peoples: the doctrine of tenure. 14
Tenure is one of the earliest doctrines of the common law. It is a doctrine
of feudal land law according to which property rights in land stem from and
are held 'of the Crown' (Mabo (No 2): 43). In Mabo (No.2), Brennan cites
this now transformed doctrine as the principle which constitutes that
skeleton of the common law that cannot be fractured even at the cost of
the injustice of racial discrimination.
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The peace and order of Australian society is built on the legal system. It
can be modified to bring it into conformity with contemporary notions of
justice and human rights, but it cannot be destroyed. It is not possible, a
priori, to distinguish between cases that express a skeletal principal and
those which do not, but no case can command unquestioning adherence
if the rule it expresses seriously offends the values of justice and human
rights (especially equality before the law) which are the aspirations of the
contemporary Australian legal system. If a postulated rule of the common
law expressed in earlier cases seriously offends those contemporary
values, the question arises whether the rule should be maintained or
applied. Whenever such a question arises, it is necessary to assess whether
the particular rule is an essential doctrine of our legal system and
whether, if the rule were to be overturned, the disturbance to be
apprehended would be disproportionate to the benefit flowing from the
overturning (Mabo (No 2): 30).

The compromise is embodied in a new 'logical postulate' (Mabo (No 2):
50) of the Australian commonwealth - radical title as a power over land that
is less than ownership but which enables the Sovereign to extinguish native
title when it wants to. 15
The compromise that Brennan's judgment represents has been hailed as a
virtuoso display of the pragmatic genius of the common law (Bartlett 1993).
Yet what it amounts to is that the judgment, in the very act of belatedly
recognising aboriginal property in the Australian continent and the Torres
Strait Islands, has crafted the legal means and justification for its
extinguishment by a sovereign power, that is (in substance) and is not (in
form) above the law.
The sovereign power mayor may not be exercised with solicitude for the
welfare of the indigenous inhabitants but, in the case of the common law
countries, the courts cannot review the merit, as distinct from the
legality, of the exercise of sovereign power...(Mabo (No 2): 63, our
emphasis).
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Sovereignty shifts about. It might be located in the body of the monarch or
in the government or in 'the Crown'. Outside of that configuration
sovereignty may be in the nation. What the courts cannot do is represented
in terms of a merits (substance) - legality (form) dichotomy: a distinction
which is, of course, a creature of legal thought. The sovereign power is, at
such moments, not the nation. It is more like 'the State' against which the
common law, infused by liberal ideology, guards 'the individual'. The
merits-legality distinction is both means and product of the common law's
vigilance on behalf of individual rights. The Australian nation is the political
community that is constituted in this not quite even balance of law and
politics within time that is truly out of joint. In the result, the common law
is not implicated in the past (the law is innocent, it was the sovereign
who/which did it); but nor is it excluded from the future (the law maintains
peace and order by overseeing the form but not the substance of relations
between the sovereign and individual subjects); and, in the present, its
skeleton of principle is not 'fractured' (the law protects individuals' rights
to private property). The tortured idea of a plain and clear intention to
extinguish that which was known not to exist and the idea of radical title of
the sovereign, however, reveal the tensions in play.16
The English jurist, H.LA.Hart, has quite properly said that when it comes to
the most knotty problem of positivist jurisprudence, the problem of what
will be seen as 'law', 'all that succeeds is success' (Hart 1961: 149). In so far
as native title is said by the Court to be based on and derive its content
from aboriginal law, this is just such a problem. Aboriginal law is not
foreign law, it is not common law. It does not fit the Englishness of the
ancient constitution. Nor will it fit the idea of law given by a sovereign to a
subject unless Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander sovereignty is
conceded. But the Court will not make this concession. Still it is law in
some sense: a sense that can be 'washed away by the tides of history' even
though aboriginal peoples remain.
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But if this success, this pragmatic genius of the Mabo (No.2) solution, is
predicated on shifting sovereignty and disjointed time, a similar ambiguity
affects the identity of this nation's indigenous subjects. With the
abandoning of the doctrine of terra nullius as a doctrine of property law,
Aboriginal people may now be accorded some rights over their (sic) land
and acquire a legal persona as 'native'. In this character of 'native' at law,
the only characteristics which are recognised are those allowed by law.
Everything else is expunged on the basis of the conditioning 'free and
equal' legal person. Re-clothed by the law, 'native' peoples are only those
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island peoples who are able to display a
continuing connection with their land, only those whose law has not been
'washed away'. Because focus is limited to the issue of 'continuing
connection', and not the context in which connection was maintained - or
not - a great deal of the particular history of aboriginal groups is excluded
from the history of this nation. The variety of histories which have been
visited upon aboriginal peoples since white occupation, and in particular
the more invasive and destructive interventions that are the history of
many urban Aboriginal groups, are whited out.
While this might appear unjust, a legal writing of the history of the nation
by the coloniser, it is similar to the construction of other legal personae.
Freed from our particularities, our history, our class, sex and race/ethnicity,
we are equal.
But now there is another oddness. As 'connected to land' the native is not
free of all determination. On the other hand, as not-'connected to land' the
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander individual is not-native. Indigenous
people then, are now officially and legally divided: by property, by class.
CUriously and perversely, the recognition of native title in Australia has the
consequence that those aboriginal peoples who do not satisfy the
requirements of being 'native' continue to be unidentified inhabitants of a
terra nullius. Indeed, Eddie Mabo, the man whose name now signifies the
recognition of native title in Australia, is himself an illustration of its curious
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and perverse character. His native title claim was disallowed. Had he lived,
he would have remained an inhabitant of terra nullius. Perhaps he may
have found some consolation in that, in being denied identity as native, in
non-recognition of their claims to land, aboriginal people such as himself,
are 'freed' from their cultural identity and become 'equal' to all other
Australians. Perhaps he may not.
This is Australian racism, historically grounded in the dispossession,
slaughter and neglect of Aboriginal people and a 'White Australia'
immigration policy. Brennan's tortured attempt to declare the common law
innocent of acts of dispossession of Aboriginal peoples is so far from
succeeding that the legal foundation of that racism is revealed.
It would be a curious doctrine to propound today that, when the benefit
of the common law was first extended to Her Majesty's indigenous
subjects in its Antipodes, its first fruits were to strip them of their right to
occupy their ancestral lands (Mabo (No 2): 39).
Mabo (No.2) might be termed its second fruits: the Australian common law

has now managed to strip those Aboriginal people whose connection with
their pre-colonial land has been broken of the identity at law of native
inhabitants of Australia. It is a further act of colonisation that compounds
dispossession by non-recognition of Aboriginal identity.
Reflections
There are several objections that will be urged to this analysis. The one that
most concerns us is that this is too harsh a characterisation of Mabo (No.2).
Mter all, for at least the Meriam people, and probably, at some time in the
future, for some mainland Aboriginal peoples, there is the benefit of the
successful native title land claim. 17 These are gains but they are not a
recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples' relationship
with land. Nor are they a recognition of their law. 18 They are, within the
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logic of Western thought and language and the dynamics of capitalist
production, a subsumption of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander being
under the commodity form of Anglo-Australian property law. They cannot
be anything else until the full doctrine of terra nullius, its application to
questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction as well as to property, is
abolished. Even then, and so long as the wealth of the Australian nation is
generated through a capitalist mode of production, the subsumption
referred to will continue.
It is a subsumption within Western thought and language. These are not
universal. We do not say that successful native title claimants will
necessarily be assimilated and decultured. We make no judgment about
what aboriginal people ought to do. It is to say that the admittance of
aboriginal land claims into the framework of an Anglo-Australian law that
has not yet recognised the implications of its own doctrines is a further act
of colonisation. In that sense non-aboriginal Australians remain colonisers
and Australian racism turns out not to be the prerogative of 'the right' and
'the rednecks'. It is also to say that by recognising native title but, affirming
a still imperial Crown's radical title in the Australian continent, what the
High Court has done is to authorise not only the past but also the future
extinguishment of that title. The effect of the Commonwealth Race
Discrimination Act 1975 and now the Native Title Act 1993, is that AngloAustralian law requires payment of compensation on extinguishment.
Aboriginal land, brought within the Australian common law, becomes
exchangeable with money, a commodity: 'he look "honest" - big white
thief'.
In terms of the debate that Mabo (No.2) has provoked, the poverty of
actually existing politicS has been reflected in the reduction of positions to
a pro-Mabo, pro-judicial intervention position and an anti-Mabo, antijudicial activism one. It is not possible, in our view to disentangle the
concept of race from the practice of European colonisation over the past
five hundred years. If racism in Australia is to be addressed the continuity
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of these practices in the 'successes' of legal reason must also be addressed.
This is the dubious impetus of Mabo (No.2) in the current national policy
of reconciliation, and one which cannot be recog-nised by the reductive
dichotomies available within existing politics.
It is Australian racism, and not our analysis of Mabo (No.2), that is too
harsh: too harsh to be tolerable or tolerated when it, inevitably, frustrates
the good intentions of reforming initiatives. Our point is not to say that
such initiatives ought not to be taken or participated in, but to say that
what is intolerable, for us, is to be continuously constructed as colonisers.
That is not an identity we want: not a political relationship to indigenous
people we want.
Nor is our analysis too harsh in lacking a standpoint from which
decolonisation can be furthered. It is not, to put that another way, only
negative, or only critical. Sovereignty shifts from here to there in Brennan's
judgment, but his idea that 'sovereignty imports supreme internal legal
authority' into a territory (Mabo (No 2): 36) is revealing. To challenge
sovereignty is to challenge the court's authority and this is to question the
law's monopoly over legitimised force to make people conform with the
identities it imposes upon them. It is not only Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people whom the law robs of the capacity for self-determination. It
is, indeed, the law's true universality to rob us all of that capacity. 19
This commonality gives the standpoint referred to. It is abstract and it is
attenuated by differences of wealth and power which depend on the value
of the rights which we get back in our more determined legal personae. To
this question of the value of rights, legal thought is endemically hostile. It
will not take account of class relations, not only because they raise the issue
of the unequal value of legal rights so bluntly, but because class relations
are private property relations. And the protection of private property has
been identified as one of the fundamental functions of the Australian
courts. But for us, the issue of private property is an important one in
trying to resist the constant attenuation of the standpOint from which
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decolonisation can be furthered. For while that standpoint is now abstract
and attenuated, it is one from which we can understand that we, as well as
those we colonise, have much to gain from self-determination.

Notes
There are continuing difficulties in referring to peoples whose identity was so
disregarded as to have deprived them of their names. We refer to all
indigenous peoples in Australia as 'indigenous' or 'aboriginal', reserving
'Aboriginal' for Australia's mainland indigenous peoples as distinct from
Torres Strait Islander people.
This is a generalisation which is differentially true of decisions made within
the common law and equitable jurisdictions of the couns. Equity, as a distinct
body of legal doctrine, gradually formed from the practices of the Coun of
Chancery from about the founeenth century in England. It glossed the older
common law with decisions better adapted to the practices of landowners in
a society that was in a process of transformation from feudalism to capitalism.
Perhaps the main impetus here were equitable procedures which enabled
more minute inquiry into the facts of particular cases (Baker 1978: 37f0.
While common law and equitable jurisdictions are now fused in England and
Australia, differences in reasoning remain perceptible and it remains the case
that in the application of originally equitable doctrines, there is a closer
examination of the facts. It is not however so close as to undo the priority of
law over fact.
A case may involve a dispute over the facts or over the law or both. The
litigation in Mabo (No.2) was handled (under directions from the High Coun)
in such a way that argument before it was confined to questions of law broadly, did the Australian common law have a doctrine of native title under
which its indigenous peoples could claim some form of property in land in
Australia?
This characterisation of Mabo (No.2) is rejected by Gummow J. in the most
recent High Coun case dealing with native title Wik Peoples v The State of
Queensland and Others (1996) (hereafter Wik). In his view 'the gist ofMabo
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(No 2) lay in the holding that the long understood refusal in Australia to
accommodate within the common law concepts of native title rested upon
past assumptions of historical fact now shown to have been false' (Wik: 229).
Gummow's view reflects the orientations of equitable thought in common
law systems in that historically, and as a consequence of different procedures,
courts exercising equitable jurisdiction made closer inquiries into the facts of
the cases before them than did the common law courts. It is also an attempt
to deflect political criticism of the High Court for 'changmg the law'. The
problem with this characterisation is that historically it was known within the
first decades of British occupation that Australia was generously populated by
Aboriginal peoples and that assumptions made by Cook and Banks to the
contrary were false (Reynolds 1987: 31£0.
Marx's discussion of his dialectical method is in Grundrisse (1973b: 100-108).
The analogy made does not entail acceptance of the idea that dialectical
thought is reducible to method. Cf. Rose 1981: 24ff.
As does Hegel, who takes the legal person as an objectification within legal
thought of the will, and Pashukanis who takes it as the most general
expression of the freedom of the owner of property to dispose of that
property on the market. Hegel 1991· 67-72; Pashukanis 1978· 109-10
7

Attorney-General ofNew South Wales v Brown (1947) 1Legge's Reports 313.
The best account of the land rights movement in Australia, in our view, is
GIlbert 1973.
This was spelled out and justified as late as 1971 in Milirrpum v Nabalco Ply
Ltd and the Commonwealth ofAustralia (1971).

10

It could be dismissed as an idiosyncratic view of one judge, and later legal
scholars, judges and practitioners who want to make the best of Mabo (No.2)
in terms of the common law's reforming capacities may well do just that.
They are justified in so doing by the conventions of legal analysis. But these
conventions and their use to justify the dismissal of legal embarrassments are
not going to reveal the dubious impetus of Mabo (No.2) referred to in our
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introduction. Belief in the common law's reforming capacity, in the end, is
not so very different from Brennan]'s belief in its innocence. Conventions of
legal analysis used to justify either belief - for clearly enough Brennan.J would
regard his belief as true - only take us back to Gilbert's reflections on belief
and truth, right and wrong in circumstances of colonialism
II

12

1\

Ii

I,

Popularised by Austin 1832; revised and adapted to mid-twentieth century
ideology by Hart 1961.
These ideas are articulated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by
judges of the English common law courts, in particular Coke and Hale.
Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Law's ofEngland (c.1765) acquired
great authority as a source of legal knowledge drew inconsistently both on
common law theory and positivist ideas of parliamentary sovereignty.
Christopher Hill has persuasively located common law theory in prerevolutionary English politics, arguing that common law theory was an
attempt by common lawyers to manufacture a constitutional settlement of
the impending civil war (Hill 1980). For a more jurisprudential general
account of common law theory see Postema 1986. Common law theory
enjoys something of a revival in the context of native title jurisprudence
(McNeil 1989).
For an account of this reaction see Cowlishaw 1995.
In Wik, Brennan C.J" this time in the minority, used this doctrine in the way
suggested in our text. A narrow majority of a High Court with two new
members, refused to do so although they do not go so far as to say that the
doctrine of tenure IS no part of Australtan property law.
Ra dical title has no effect on its own (hence a logical postulate) but only
when it turns into something else - absolute ownership - if there is no other
proprietor. Another aspect of radical title is that it allows the Crown to
extinguish pre-existing title in its acqUired territory - so that it can 'dissolve'
the pre-existing proprietorial relation and assume absolute ownership for
itself or grant it to someone else.
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These tensions are within Australian society. We should note here that it is
quite possible that Australia would have returned to the murderous violence
against aboriginal people that has been its history had existing titles not been
confirmed. Even Mabo's pragmatic compromise drew out depths of racism in
Australia that some non-aboriginal people have found shocking. The brunt of
verbal and physical abuse is borne by aboriginal people across the continent
though it may be sharper in rural areas where the very limited rights available
to Aboriginal people under Mabo (No.2) are likely to have the greatest
possibility of success, as recently confirmed by the Wik decision.
There has been one other land claim accepted as native title since the Mabo
(No.2) decision of July 1992. Significantly that claim, on behalf of the
Dunghutti people, resulted in the payment of compensation rather than an
actual title to land.
For an extended, if overly conciliatory, account of the 'difficulties' of
recognition of the Meriam people's relationship to land and of their law at the
hearing of evidence prior to the High Court decision, see Sharpe 1996.
It may be the case that identities are manipulated through other exercises of
bureaucratic and professional power more or more directly than by law. We
do not make the mistake of dismissing valuable work done within broadly
Foucauldian ways of thought on this question. See for example the work of
Dean 1995 on welfare law, an area which belongs within the field of property
law, if only because such trouble is taken to keep it out. But attention to
other ways in which power is exercised should not exclude its legal
deployment and the broader contours of race and class within that exercise.
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